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Materiality lies inescapably at the heart of the commons, and this chapter explores the 
idea that a New Materialist onto-epistemology might offer an important contribution to 
the power of commoning as ontological politics.1 In particular, the chapter explores what 
it might mean to think of non-human actants as commoners—that is to say, to think of 
non-human actants (both organic and inorganic) as lively partners in commons 
entanglements. What might that mean for the ongoing challenge of living together, as 
commoners, in a world facing multiple crises?  
  Bollier and Helfrich suggest that commons, which are found all over the world, 
express a deep and irrepressible human longing and that “the process of commoning—of 
joint action, of creating things together, of cooperating to meet shared goals—is 
ubiquitous.”2 What happens, then, when we imagine commons to be ubiquitous because 
they are first and foremost a living mesh of processes of living-together reflecting the 
nature of lively materiality itself? What happens when we take that as far as embracing 
the “agency” of inorganic matter, not stopping at the boundaries of “life?” What insights, 
ontological, epistemological and ethical, emerge? What gains might there be for a 
political ecology of the commons? 
  The discussion in this chapter has the following structure: First, I briefly 
introduce commons, commoning and the idea of “nature” as a fractious frontline 
between opposing forms of ontological politics. Next, I position the urgency of 
ontological politics in relation to the Anthropocene-Capitalocene. Finally, I bring the 
commons into conversation with New Materialism in order to think about the potential 
implications of embracing non-human actants as commoners. Might the kind of ethical 
and epistemological attentiveness introduced by New Materialist ontology produce ways 
of living against the deadening objectifications performed by neoliberalism, and further 
underline the potency of the commons as a better way of living together in the present 
planetary situation?  
 
2. Commons, Commoning and the Fractious Space of “Nature”  
It is clear that for many commons scholars, commons structures express normative 
principles governing cooperatively designed human social relationships and are firmly 
located in human communities. Helfrich and Haas, for example, offering an authoritative 
account of commons relationalities in 2008, identified four central normative principles 
governing the social relationships at the heart of the commons, all of which are, in 
context, envisaged as governing the relations between human commoners: “fair access,” 
“equitably shared benefit,” “responsibility for preserving the resource,” and “democratic 
and transparent decision-making.”3 Helfrich and Haas define commons as  																																																								
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a shared ownership relationship, which, at the same time, entails a shared responsibility 
and shared beneficiary relationship. This relationship does not exist “in and of itself,” 
that is, it is not inherent in the resource or the good. It is a social convention; it is law 
and norm, whether formal or informal. Or it is a behavioural pattern. In other words, 
the commons is fundamentally about social relationships. Commons are not the 
resources themselves but among individuals and a resource and individuals and each 
other.4 
 
  The definition offered by Helfrich and Haas, no matter that it accurately reflects 
core features of many commons, would be unlikely to go uncontested. Commons 
scholarship is, indeed, an increasingly lively arena. Commons certainly embrace archaic 
forms, but there is also an explosive multiplicity of newer commons and modes of 
commoning.  
  New forms of commoning are now so diverse that McCarthy, reviewing the field, 
claims that he is uncertain “how much these many new ‘commons’ might have in 
common.”5 McCarthy’s central focus is on the way in which new commons forms and 
movements depart from earlier forms of commons understood, in the relevant 
scholarship, as common pool resources and common property regimes.6 These forms of 
commons, first canvassed in academic scholarship in response to Hardin’s famous 1968 
article, “The Tragedy of the Commons,”’7 reflect early theoretical models of the 
commons offered by scholars such as Ostrom.8  
  According to McCarthy, the new commons movements depart from the 
understandings “refined and advocated in a large and robust line of research over the 
past few decades”9 in three main respects: first, they move beyond the older scholarly 
understandings; secondly, the kinds of commons being generated in the new commons 
movements are more eclectic than the “fisheries, forests and agrarian landscapes”10 
characterizing the typical subjects of the earlier research; and thirdly, new commons 
dynamics emerge from a far wider array of actors. McCarthy’s analysis leads him to 
conclude that what the new commons movements do share—notwithstanding their 
myriad forms, foci and modes of expression—is “their assertion of collective ownership 
and rights against relentless privatization and commodification” and their movement 
away from traditional commons concerns with common property regimes in a 
heterogeneous tide of resistance against the “neoliberalization of nature.”11  
  If the youthful, insurgent energies of the newer commons movements are best to 
be understood as a wave of resistance to neoliberalism’s reduction of “nature” to a 
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privatized, financialized resource,12 then much turns on the ability of commons 
formations to resist neoliberal capture.  
  It seems that it is difficult for anything at all to resist neoliberal capture. Indeed, 
the commons, despite the fact that commons are sometimes assumed to be inherently 
anti-neoliberal, already shows signs of partial capture. Caffentzis, for example, 
demonstrates how the notion of the “commons” is deployed to “describe very different, 
indeed conflicting, purposes and realities” by those invoking it,13 actively canvassing the 
possibility that the commons is deployed, indeed, as “Neoliberalism’s Plan B.”14  
  Caffentzis reads the resurgence in commons thinking and action as the being 
result of a convergence between reactions to challenges facing capitalism and socialism 
respectively. He argues that the imperative for capitalist deployment of the commons 
(reflected in various contemporary vocabularies and initiatives related to “social capital,” 
the “business community,” etc.) reflects the need for capitalism itself to mediate the 
more self-destructive logics of neoliberalism and to “propose other models for 
participating in the market, besides individualism or corporatism.”15 This, then, is 
commons deployed as capitalist rehabilitation. Meanwhile, the anti-capitalist commons 
impulse pushes back against the failures of socialism and communism to offer genuinely 
collective modes of social organization. Anti-capitalist invocations of the commons, 
argues Caffentzis, draw upon the inspiration of older, archaic and pre-capitalist 
commons while simultaneously embracing the rise of the new commons, “especially in 
ecological-energy spaces and in computational-informational manifolds.”16  
  Caffentzis argues that the fact that the mantle of the commons is so easily 
applied/extended to so many variant situations, and the fact that commons projects are 
so ubiquitous, generates a certain level of ambiguity, and that the simultaneous 
deployment of the commons to “deal with the crisis and limits of both neoliberalism and 
socialism/communism/nationalism” explains “both the surprising popularity of the term 
and the confusion it induces.”17  
  For Caffentzis, this confusion hinges, in part, upon a critical failure in commons 
discourse: the assumption made among anti-capitalists that commons thought and praxis 
is “inevitably anticapitalist—” a failure—in short—to recognize the co-existence of two 
kinds of commons: “(1) pro-capitalist commons that are compatible with and potentiate 
capitalist accumulation and (2) anti-capitalist commons that are antagonistic to and 
subversive of capitalist accumulation.”18  
  In order to illustrate his claim about pro-capitalist commons, Caffentzis 
delineates the strategy of the World Bank and other institutions of global neoliberal 
capitalism to subvert anti-capitalist agendas. He suggests that there was a capitalist need 
to address popular resistance to the privatization of common property, a need that led to 
a neoliberal acceptance of commons (for example, of agrarian and forest commons) as 
being “at least as a stop-gap, transitional institution when revolts of the landless or the 
devastation of forests become destabilising to the general exploitation of a territory or 
population.”19 In certain discursive and regulatory formations, therefore, commons can 
become tools of capitalist accumulation—or minimally, can be deployed to 																																																								
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legitimize/facilitate an agenda of neoliberal capitalist predation. Caffentzis’s argument on 
this point has considerable resonance with other critiques of neoliberal agendas, 
including those addressing neoliberal strategies in the face of climate and environmental 
crisis and a range of related issues. Dehm, for example, convincingly argues that the 
features of the carbon offset scheme REDD+ (Reducing Emission from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation)—which relies upon the communal efforts of indigenous 
peoples living in and around forests, as well as upon rights-based interventions such as 
tenure reform and free, prior and informed consent—tend to operationalize the capture 
of indigenous forest communities within the neoliberal Green Economy.20  
  The subversion of resistance and critique, and the capture by neoliberal agendas 
of collective initiatives and alternative ways of being, living and thinking, is a strategy 
exposed time and again by critiques of neoliberal governance interventions.21 
Neoliberalism’s highly interventionist construction of the pre-conditions for its market 
system, its extensive construction of capital and finance-friendly environments,22 and its 
production of neoliberal subjects in the service of its imperatives, is the logic driving the 
application of adaptive strategies to the subversion of commons, and this logic is evident 
in the World Bank’s eager recruitment of “‘common property management groups 
among the ‘civil society’ institutions.”23 Neoliberal exploitation of the productivity of the 
commons is transparent in such initiatives and developments, and Caffentzis points out 
that the Common Property Resource Management Group (CPRNet) was founded by the 
World Bank as early as 1995 precisely for the purpose of integrating commons 
organizations “into the larger project of making the world safe for neoliberalism.”24  
  Making the world safe for neoliberalism involves, among other things, the 
extensive governance, regulation, technification and financialization of “nature” as 
“natural resources.”25 Meanwhile, constructions of “nature” are also pivotal to the 
commons. “Nature” is at the heart of the older, archetypal commons taking the form of 
“fisheries, forests and agrarian landscapes;”26 central to “nature”-centred practices of 
traditional indigenous commoners; and pivotal to multiple new commons the world 
over.27 Indeed, as noted above, anti-capitalist “new commons,” for all their dynamic 
heterogeneity, converge in resistance to the “neoliberalization of nature.”28 “Nature” thus 
forms a materio-semiotic frontline, not only between the two competing versions of the 
commons identified by Caffentzis but of a global ontological struggle between anti-
capitalist commons and neoliberalism’s biopolitical/necropolitical agenda. Accordingly, 
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“Nature,” increasingly forced to “speak” as “environment,”29 forms a decisive zone of 
contestation across which a life and death struggle over the meanings and forms of co-
living and the status of life itself now takes place. (It is also, as will be noted later in this 
chapter, a construct widely deployed for the oppression and marginalization of humans 
(and non-humans) constructed as being non-rational by Eurocentric ontology and 
epistemology.) 
  The totalizing ambition of neoliberalism’s agenda is well captured by Luke’s 
Foucauldian analysis of the Worldwatch Institute,30 which emerges as a particularly 
salient example of the ambivalence of “progressive” narratives such as (in Luke’s case) 
environmentalism and (in the World Bank example above) the commons.  
  Luke records that in a Worldwatch Institute publication, Brown, Flavin and 
Postel reject “a narrow economic view of the world”31 and argue that “growth is 
confined by the parameters of the biosphere.”32 The Institute’s aim, reflected in its 
publication, Luke writes, is to “meld ecology with economics to infuse environmental 
studies with economic instrumental rationality and defuse economics with ecological 
systems reasoning.”33 While the ostensible aim of this double-headed strategy is 
apparently to ensure that economic growth cannot be decoupled from its substrate in 
natural systems and resources, it ultimately articulates a strategy expressing the 
WorldWatch Institute’s “vision of geo-power and eco-knowledge as the instrumental 
rationality of resource managerialism working on a global scale.”34 In this process, 
“Nature” is reduced to a cybernetic system of four planetary biophysical systems 
supplying the global resources for the human population and translated into technical 
data for the management and capture of life itself as an object of ecological hyper-
control.  
  The ambivalence of this strategy is both striking and familiar. As De Lucia has 
pointed out, when environmental interventions are read through the lens of Foucauldian 
biopolitics, even ecologically-driven critiques become legible as “a new set of normalizing 
strategies extending the scope of biopolitical technologies of power from human 
populations to the entire natural world.”35 Of course, control of population and 
environment has long been interlinked. As Rutherford puts it, “the definition and 
administration of populations simultaneously requires the constitution and management 
of the environment in which those populations exist and upon which they depend.”36 It 
is this bottom-line that explains the central focus of both pro- and anti-capitalist 
commons on “nature,” and why “the environment” has become the core fulcrum point 
of ontological—and ontic—struggles.  
  Luke suggests that the Worldwatch writers are engaged in nothing less than a 
struggle to shift “the authorizing legitimacy of truth claims used in policy analysis away 
from economic terms to ecological terms … [thereby] working to reframe the 
power/knowledge systems of advanced capitalist societies.”37 In this light, the neoliberal 
deployment of the commons, and its related recruitment and regulatory disciplining of 																																																								
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communities and indigenous practices as modes of neoliberal governance are entirely 
predictable.  
The struggle between neoliberalism (with its deployment of pro-capitalist 
commons) and the anti-capitalist commons movement centers—in the final analysis—on 
the present and future of life on the planet. On the one hand, a global control system 
made up of a complex assemblage of actors, regulatory mechanisms and calculative 
market structures marshals and reduces life to informatics—to privatized, propertized, 
financialized market-friendly processes and products—deploying ecological mechanisms 
of managerialism. On the other hand, all over the planet, human commoners of multiple 
kinds explicitly resist such logics, urgently seeking to express a radically different kind of 
ontology and to reject the neoliberalization of nature.38  
  Emphasizing the “intrinsic value” of “nature” is thus a familiar theme in 
commons scholarship, though it is unclear how many commons scholars pay attention to 
the instability of nature as a referent39—or to its historical, oppressive deployments as a 
system of marginalization. Notwithstanding the instability of “nature” as a referent, one 
thing seems clear: the reduction of “nature” to spaces of acquisition, capitalist 
accumulation and aggressive eco-managerialism as “environment” fully reflects the 
“environing” (encircling and controlling)40 governance strategies identified by Luke as 
central expressions of eco-knowledge and geo-power.41 Neoliberal eco-governmentality 
expresses   
 
the continuous attempt to reinvent the forces of Nature in the economic exploitation of 
advanced technologies linking structures in Nature to the rational management of its 
energies as geo-power, [which] is an ongoing supplement to the disciplinary construction 
of various modes of bio-power in promoting the growth [and control] of human 
populations.42   
 
Such critiques resonate well with Caffentzis’s analysis of the subversion of 
commons in the service of making the world secure for the neoliberal order. The sheer 
scale of ambition intrinsic to neoliberal eco-governmentality, and the totality of what is 
put at stake for lively systems and for human populations means that it is now urgently 
necessary, with Escobar, to position anti-capitalist commons as sites and formations of a 
vibrant ontological politics43 lined up against the ontological imperialism of an equally 
political neoliberalism.  
 
3. Commons and Commoning as Ontological Politics 
Escobar, primarily an anti-globalization social movements scholar, argues that for 
commoners “the defense of territory, life and the commons are one and the same.”44 He 
addresses the “ontological dimension of commoning,” arguing that “whereas the 
occupation of territories implies economic, technological, cultural, ecological and often 
armed aspects, its most fundamental dimension is ontological:”45 ontological occupation 																																																								
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40 Ibid, 63-5. 
41 Ibid, at 57. 
42 Ibid, at 58. 
43 Escobar, “Commons in the pluriverse.”  
44 Ibid, 352. 
45 Ibid. 
spawns “ontological struggles.”46 These are struggles, as Escobar frames them, to maintain 
“multiple worlds” against the “One World World” imposed by the neoliberal market 
order.47 Escobar imagines the commons in their anti-capitalist forms pitted against the 
the neoliberal colonization of life-worlds. This is the commons and commoning as 
ontological struggle against “the merciless world of the global 10 percent, foisted upon 
the 90 percent and the natural world with a seemingly ever-increasing degree of virulence 
and cynicism.”48 
  Weber, like Escobar, turns towards the question of commons ontology. Weber 
argues that the structure of reality itself—even the perception that yields it to the human 
being’s gaze—is a commons49—and that the crisis signalled by the Anthropocene 
provides an opportunity to re-conceive of the “relationship between humanity and 
nature” and to “reimagine our ontological condition.”50 Weber’s response to this 
opportunity is to evoke what he calls “Enlivenment” as a post-Enlightenment (or 
“Enlightenment II”) “ontology of aliveness, of coming to life, that is at once physical 
and intangible, and scientific and spiritual.”51 Weber argues, indeed, that the perspective 
of the commons is now indispensible to understanding “the relationship of humans to 
reality.”52 Weber, like Escobar, also assumes the anti-capitalist strain of commons theory, 
praxis and activism. He also embraces non-dualistic indigenous cosmovisions and the 
need to reject the ontological colonization enacted by Enlightenment reductionism.   
 Taken together, the commons ontological framework offered by Weber and 
Escobar offers a corrective to the instrumentalist paradigm of “nature.” The complexity-
sensitive and pluriversal energies at the heart of the ontology intimated by Escobar and 
Weber read together opens a seam for depth-exploration of epistemic and ontological 
resistance to hegemonic neoliberal coloniality and the tyranny of the knowing “centre.”53   
  While the instability of “nature” as a referent persists, it is clear that neither of 
these writers make the assumption that “nature” is intrinsically benign. The commons of 
“nature” remains full of tensions—with implications for the practice of ontological 
politics as process: Weber, for example, in his long essay Enlivenment, makes the point 
that his ontological proposal means that “[t]o be really alive means to be embedded in a 
mess that must constantly be negotiated.”54 Weber argues that binaries are to be replaced 
by an epistemic practice of embracing paradox and living with oppositionalities in a 
constant, flexible negotiation—an embrace of paradox central and necessary to the 
“poetic materialism” he proposes.55  
  Weber’s account points the way towards an ontological politics unafraid of 
internal tension, complexity, paradox and ambiguity. Does poetic materialism, however, 
go far enough? Might New Materialist onto-epistemology add something valuable the 
mix? 
   
4. Encountering “Poetic Materialism”—An Existential Ecological Ontology 																																																								
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It seems important to address Weber’s work because it offers a materialist ontology for 
the commons, and, at points, explicitly also addresses the commons as praxis. His work 
invites engagement, therefore, in a chapter offering New Materialist insights that might 
contribute distinctive threads to the development of a more radical commons ontology.  
 In reading Weber—and the New Materialist authors I later discuss—I have 
chosen to keep in mind Bennett’s argument that vocabulary is a precusor to, and pivotal 
for, the level of “discernment” intrinsic to appreciating the “active powers” of the more-
than-human. 56 How, then, does Weber’s vocabulary position the more-than-human for 
the commons? And what does his choice of language imply concerning the ontology of 
poetic materialism? 
  Weber argues, in Enlivenment, that at the heart of the commons are “diverse 
interests negotiating mutually acceptable outcomes, and individual actors coming to 
respectful terms with their habitat. This concept transcends the idea of a mere exchange 
of resources and covers many areas of human-human and human-nature interactions.”57 
Weber’s language here explicitly foregrounds “human-human” and “human-nature” 
interactions. It is immediately noticeable—and interesting—that there is no explicit 
equivalence given here to “nature-human” and “nature-nature” interactions. The 
linguistic formulation here seems potentially to foreground the human in a way that sits 
at nuanced variance with Weber’s broader ontological framework, which openly 
embraces the meaningful and meaning-generative capacities of “other animate beings, 
which, after all share the same capacities [as humans] for embodied experiences and 
‘worldmaking’.”58 Indeed, Weber’s book Enlivenment explicitly places “other animate 
beings” alongside the human and explicitly centers his ontology on life/zoe—even 
proposing a new designation of the Anthropocene as the “Zoocene.’’59   
  Weber offers what he calls a “wild naturalism” based on  
 
the idea of nature as an unfolding process of ever-growing freedom and creativity 
paradoxically linked to material and embodied processes. The biosphere is alive in the 
sense that it does not only obey the rules of deterministic or stochastic interactions of 
particles, molecules, atoms, fields and waves. The biosphere is also very much about 
producing agency, expression, and meaning.60 
 
  Weber’s later works further develop this wild naturalism. Weber proposes a 
“poetic materialism,” or “erotic ecology,” primarily establishing his ontology by 
foregrounding embodied affective relationality and by highlighting the interiority and 
“desire” of material entities for each other in terms reminiscent of panpsychism. In fact, 
Weber’s panpsychic resonance seems close—in some respects—to the panpsychism 
presented by Mathews in For Love of Matter—as “a subjectival dimension, to 
materiality.”61  
  This subjectival dimension to materiality, in Weber’s philosophy, is activated as 
an ethical and creative force through the phenomenon of “feeling:”  
 
Emotional experience is not alien to the conception of an ecological commons but 
central to it. In an ethics of mutual ecological transformation, feeling is a central part. As 																																																								
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inwardness is the necessary way bodies experience themselves, feeling is also a crucial 
component of an ecological ethics.62   
  
  Weber sees ecological commons as complex, rhizomatic, situated, sites of 
interactivity. These are characterized—as is his conception of “nature” more generally—
by the “mutual transformation” of embodied agents. Weber argues that “Agency is 
always inscribed within a living system of other animate forces, each of which is both 
sovereign and interdependent at the same time”63—and that in a commons, humans are 
not “ruler[s]” but “attentive subject[s] in a network of relationships.”64 Every commons 
is, therefore, “a material and informal network of living, incarnate and meaningful 
connections, which constantly changes as it mutates and evolves—”65 “a community 
(between humans and/or nonhuman agents).”66   
  Weber argues that the commons, because it does not conceptually detach 
commoners from the space of commoning, dissolves the nature/culture divide because it 
cancels the divide between the social and the ecological.67 While it might be objected that 
it would take more argument than this satisfactorily to establish that seeing the commons 
in this way dissolves the socio-ecological divide, it is clear that, in an important and 
central sense, Weber imagines commoning to be an active, affective community between 
humans and/or non-human agents.  
  This is all very promising.  
  However, at the same time, there is an elusive tenor of lingering human centrality 
in Weber’s writing. Reading him more closely, this tenor seems to emerge from the 
“poetic” expression of his erotic ecological materialism—a communicative choice 
producing a subtle linguistic traction towards the centrality of human experience. 
 Access to the “innermost core of aliveness” of matter, Weber argues, is “only 
possible through being involved in experiences and creative expression,” and 
commoning is thus described as an eco-ethical set of practices, a “culture” facilitating the 
“self-realization of Homo sapiens . . . [as] the species-specific realization of our own 
particular embodiment of being alive within a common system of other living subjects.”68 
It is important, here, to bear in mind that a central component of Weber’s passionate 
eco-philosophical project is precisely to provoke an awakening to the “aliveness” 
revealed by “new biology”—and that his choice of poetic communication is key to that. 
It is also important to acknowledge that there is indeed a potent onto-political role for 
poetic communication and consciousness-raising. Nevertheless, it seems to me that there 
is a distinction that can and should be drawn between offering (an inescapably human) 
existential perspective on the lively inter-species entanglement of a commons, and 
positioning the commons as a vehicle for the “self-realization of Homo sapiens.” The 
poetic formulations that Weber uses, moreover, seem to convey a subtle, lingering 
primacy of the human at odds with elements of his ontology. It seems that the “we” of 
the subtly central humanity is the almost inevitable offspring of the “I”-centred 
phenomenological poetics of Weber’s communicative methodology.  
  The flickeringly foregrounded human, to me at least, signals a subtle tension 
between the poetic and the analytical in Weber’s writing. He is deliberately intimately 
present to the reader in his texts as a first person, emotional narrator. His poetic, 																																																								
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experientially “felt” ontology is both discovered and shared with his readers through 
Whiteheadean shifts of perception—existential moments of personal transformative 
awareness: Weber’s writing foregrounds the centrality of his own subjective human 
account of how he “feels” the relational and “inner” aliveness of his ontological poem-
scape.  
  Clearly, such first person intimacy is a powerful rhetorical strategy for awakening 
the sensibility of the reader to the biopoetic materialist ontology that Weber seeks to 
establish as the ground of his “erotic” ecological ethics. Nonetheless, this first person 
“I”—and its apparent drift into a second person collective human “we”—has the effect, 
linguistically, of rendering the (agentic) non-human the “other” in an “I-Thou” relation 
for which the human “I’ retains a subtle priority at inconsistent and muted odds with 
Weber’s broader ontological intuitions.   
  Such priority is also implicated in some of Weber’s more general exhortations to 
transformative thinking. For example, his statement in The Biology of Wonder that “We 
must preserve living beings for life’s sake, in order for life to be able to self-organize, to 
unfold, to experience itself,”69 is a statement whose vocabulary and formulation makes 
materiality’s self-organizing capacities and “self”-“experience” dependent on a prior 
exercise of agency by an apparently human “we.” The language installs this “we” as a 
human collective whose agency must act to preserve living beings in order for life to be able 
to self-organize, to unfold, to experience itself. In context, Weber is addressing the 
environmental destruction wrought by the deadening objectification of traditional 
Western thought and science—but even so—this formulation of his point elevates 
human agency, almost rendering it a material precondition for “nature’s” self-
organizational capacities to function. This formulation hints at a kind of agentic 
overreach that ironically, echoes (without sharing other suppositions of) the agentic 
assumptions driving climate change and environmental destructiveness.  
   If, in the final analysis, Weber’s commons is a form of situated, embodied 
relationality establishing an eco-ethical set of practices serving the “self-realization of 
Homo sapiens”,70 it is little wonder that he defines a commons in terms of “human-
human and human-nature interactions.” Nevertheless, Weber’s poetic existentialism 
breathes into being an ontology that, in most respects embraces an entangled meshwork 
of lively, agentic human-non-human relations. He thus reaches (albeit inconsistently 
perhaps) beyond traditional conceptions of the commons in a welcome departure from 
the kinds of complexly constituted anthropocentrism haunting much of commons 
scholarship.  
  If we return to the definition offered by Helfrich and Haas,71 we can clearly see 
the centrality of the social to the commons. Helfrich and Haas, recall, emphasize that 
“Commons are not the resources themselves but the set of relationships that are forged 
among individuals and a resource and individuals and each other.”72 There are two things 
of note here: first, the “social” at the heart of the commons is clearly a human “social.” 
Secondly, the relationships at the heart of the commons, as formulated here, map onto 
Weber’s “human-human and human-nature interactions.” Unlike Weber’s conception, 
however, these relationships are more reductively imagined, and closer to the subject-
object assumptions of Cartesianism.  The “individual” maps onto the “human,” while  
“resource” maps onto “‘nature’/non-human source of value, etc.”—but the ontology 
implied by the language is the precisely the ontology that Weber seeks to replace with his 
poetic materialism.  																																																								
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  The definition offered by Helfrich and Haas exposes the predominant operative 
conception of the commons for which commoners are human beings and for which 
human social relationships lie at the center. Indeed, overall, it is difficult to read much 
commons scholarship without gaining the impression that there is in it a tension 
reflecting the possibility that anthropocentrism is simultaneously both rejected and re-
installed: rejected at the overt surface, re-installed by the undertow of ontological 
assumptions—assumptions revealed by vocabulary.  
  This tension suggests the possibility that commons thinking—as yet—evinces a 
certain lack of theoretical settlement. Lack of settlement—in and of itself—is not a 
negative state of affairs, of course. It can be a sign of evolution and energy and can signal 
potential for future development. Commons and commoning are capacious enough to 
embrace a multitude of ontological visions. Escobar, for example, imagines “the 
pluriverse”—an excitingly rich figuration embracing numerous ways of living and seeing, 
numerous worlds that co-exist,73 cross-fertilize, interweave and co-negotiate. Moreover, 
the centrality of “relationality” to the commons—emphasized by so much commons 
scholarship—and so poetically by Weber—readily implies the importance of providing 
epistemic space for the ontological commitments of literally thousands of communities 
the world over, many of which already embrace consciously intimate engagements with 
lively “nature.” Such epistemic space offers, in addition, a direct and important contrast 
with the systemic epistemic closure enacted by the neoliberal eco-governance order or—
to borrow Escobar’s language—by the “One world world.”74  
  All that said, it seems productive to use the tensions and opportunities emerging 
from the possibility of subtle internal contradictions in commons thinking as a space of 
indeterminacy into which to offer some brief reflections concerning more-than-human 
commoners and the distinctive contribution of a “New Materialist” approach.  
  First, however, I want to position that reflection—briefly—in relation to what it 
is that the commons as ontological politics is up against: Is there a possibility that the 
situation in which onto-struggles now take place strengthens the appeal of a New 
Materialist theorization of more-than-human commons, commoning and commoners?  
 
5. The Urgency of Ontological Politics  
To appreciate fully the decisive importance of commons as ontological politics, it seems 
important to locate reflection in the contemporary situation. This is, after all, the 
situation in which anti-capitalist commoning seeks to resist capitalist enclosures, 
appropriations and captures.  
  The contemporary era is often referred to as “Anthropocene,” which is a widely 
deployed term for a “new age of man” in which the human species has become a 
geological, rather than just a biological, force.75 The terminology is etymologically drawn 
from Anthropos (man) and kainos (new)—and was first popularized in 2002.76 It is 
important to remember, however, that despite the notion that the “anthropos” of the 
Anthropocene is a species figuration, in reality, it is not.77 Moreover, as Haraway has 
pointed out, the Anthropocene is intrinsically coupled with the scale of the “global,” and 
the “global” is highly specific in its origins and development.78 In reality, the Anthropocene 																																																								
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reflects highly uneven historical processes of colonization79 and rampant capitalist neo-
coloniality.80 So specific—indeed—is the “global” folded into the Anthropocene that the 
“Anthropocene” is also identified by some as the “Capitalocene.”81  
  I will use the term “Anthropocene-Capitalocene” to foreground the uneven 
origins and contemporary mal-distribution of Anthropocene climate and environmental 
fallouts; the fundamentally colonial capitalist imperatives driving the continuing 
structural dominance of the fossil-fuel economy;82 extensive, and continuing, corporate 
enclosures in the Global South;83 and the pervasive and expanding commodification and 
technification of “nature.”84  
  So much is at stake. Neoliberalism is now the dominant engine of the 
Anthropocene-Capitalocene: it enacts violence extensively visited upon communities, 
individuals, places, animals, ecosystems and other lively materialities either in the way of or 
(alternatively) in the sights of, neoliberal agendas. The colonizing of multiple life-worlds at 
stake in neoliberal accumulation reiterates, and builds on, earlier patterns of ontological 
(and epistemological) violence85 underlying Eurocentric power distributions of the 
international legal order.86 More fundamentally, neoliberal accumulative rationalism 
ultimately relies—as Weber and Escobar both either state or imply—upon a central, 
binary set of severed ontological relations between “humans” and “nature,” between 
“subject” and “object”. Ontology is at the heart of the current sets of crises. The well-
rehearsed, uneven, and entirely predictable mal-distributions of life and death 
characterizing the Anthropocene-Capitalocene thus draw upon the same fundamental 
ontological splits as have long operated in the service of Eurocentric, masculinist, 
colonizing power.87 In the Anthropocene-Capitalocene, neoliberalism’s 
biopolitical/necropolitical logics are driving a potential terminus—including for human 
beings. As Stengers puts it in In Catastrophic Times,88 human beings face, potentially “the 
death of what we have called a civilization [—and, she reminds us—] there are many 
manners of dying, some being more ugly than others.”89 Even death itself—the great 
leveler—is unevenly distributed, whether as terminus or process. 
  Neoliberalism actively exploits the notion that there is no other solution to the 																																																																																																																																																														
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2005).  
79 Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg, “The Geology of Mankind? A Critique of the Anthropocene 
Narrative,” The Anthropocene Review 1, no.1 (2014): 62. 
80 Max Koch, Capitalism and Climate Change: Theoretical Discussion, Historical Development and Policy Responses 
(Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2012).  
81 This proposal is offered, among others, by Haraway, “Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene”; 
Andreas Malm, Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming (London: Verso, 2016); 
Jason W. Moore (ed.), Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism and the Crisis of 
Capitalism (Oakland: PM Press, 2016). 
82 Koch, Capitalism and Climate Change; Jerome Dangerman and Hans J. Schellnhuber, ‘Energy Systems 
Transformation’ (2013) PNAS E549-E558 (available at www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1219791110) 
(Date of last access: 19 Feb 2018). 
83 Corson and McDonald, “Enclosing the global commons.”  
84 Gernot Bohme, (Cameron Shingleton Trans.), Invasive Technification: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of 
Technology (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2012).  
85 Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin, “Green Postcolonialism,” Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial 
Studies 9, no.1 (2007): 1. 
86 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 67. 
87 Sam Adelman, “Epistemologies of mastery,” in Anna Grear and Louise Kotzé (eds.), Research Handbook 
on Human Rights and the Environment (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 9-27. 
88 Isabelle Stengers, Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism (Luneburg: Open Humanities 
Press/Meson Press, 2015), available at <http://openhumanitiespress.org/books/titles/in-catastrophic-
times> (Date of last access, January 25th 2018). 
89 Ibid, at 10. 
enormity of the problems confronting humanity—and, accordingly, constructs the 
illusion that there is no alternative to neoliberal managerial eco-governance on a 
planetary scale. Indeed, Stengers argues that even “radical uncertainty with regard to the 
catastrophes that [the current crisis] is likely to produce . . . won’t make the capitalist 
machine hesitate, because it is incapable of hesitating: it can’t do anything other than 
define every situation as a source of profit.”90 The logics of consumptive capitalism will 
continue to insist—in short—that “the techno-industrial capitalist path is the only one 
that is viable”91 in the face of the Anthropocene-Capitalocene planetary crisis.  
  The ascendancy of such logic is already evident in the growing popularity of 
ethically dubious92 commitments to geo-engineering as a way of techno-fixing the 
climate, irrespective of the risks involved.93 Such hubristic strategies amount to a form of 
risky gambling with the futures of millions,94 and reveal the vulnerability of “humanity in 
its entirety [to being] taken hostage” by capitalist profit making “solutions” for the 
otherwise (supposedly) insoluble: “In this way, an ‘infernal alternative’ [is] fabricated at 
the planetary scale: either it’s us, your saviours, or it’s the end of the world.”95  
  Against such horizons, it is all the more urgent for commoning to offer multiple 
forms of resistance. The dangers for the commons, however, are pervasive: panoptic 
governance and neoliberal eco-managerialism already subvert, as we have seen, some 
commons for pro-capitalist ends, and in the final analysis, there is absolutely nothing to 
guarantee that any commons will be, or remain, immune from capture. Moreover,  		
[t]here isn’t the slightest guarantee that we will be able to overcome the hold that 
capitalism has over us (and in this instance, what some have proposed calling 
“capitalocene,” and not anthropocene, will be a geological epoch that is extremely short). 
Nor do we know how, in the best of cases, we might live in the ruins that it will leave us: 
the window of opportunity in which, on paper, the measures to take were reasonably 
clear, is in the process of closing.96 	
  If the Anthropocene-Capitalocene leaves a window of opportunity in the process 
of closing, ontology as politics could not be more decisively important or timely—and 
commoning has never been more urgent as a dynamic of ontological resistance. What, 
then, might New Materialism offer to commons thought in the face of such struggles? 
And how does New Materialism offer agentic significance to the more-than-human? And 
why might that matter in the calculus of resistance to neoliberalism’s voracious 
colonization of lifeworlds?  
 
6. New Materialist Commoning 
For New Materialist thinkers, all matter—including inorganic matter—and the 
artefactual—is agentic in the broad sense that there is, as Bennett puts it, a “capacity of 
things—edibles, commodities, storms, metals—not only to impede or block the will and 
designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities 
or tendencies of their own.”97 Bennett is explicit, moreover, about dissipating the 
																																																								
90 Ibid, at 9. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Henry Shue, “Climate dreaming: negative emissions, risk transfer, and irreversibility,” Journal of Human 
Rights and the Environment 8, no. 2 (2017) 203. 
93 Sam Adelman, “Geoengineering: rights, risks and ethics,” Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 8, 
no. 1 (2017) 119. 
94 Ibid; Shue, “Climate dreaming.” 
95 Stengers, Catastrophic Times, at 9. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, KinLoc 72-73. 
organic/inorganic binary.98 Her ontological proposal aims to challenge the “received 
concepts of agency, action, and freedom sometimes to the breaking point” and to 
“sketch a style of political analysis that can better account for the contributions of 
nonhuman actants.”99 Language is central to this task, and Bennett’s work can, in part, be 
characterized as an exercise in strategic epistemic politics: She argues that her focus is on 
“the task of developing a vocabulary and a syntax for, and thus a better discernment of, the 
active powers issuing from non-subjects.”100  
We have seen how challenging it is to find this vocabulary and syntax—and I 
have suggested that Weber’s communicative methodology presents challenges to the 
ontological consistency of poetic materialism. Bennett’s search for vocabulary, I suggest, 
does not present the same challenges for her—and her onto-epistemology does not 
adopt, or express itself through, an existentialist frame. 
The ethical task at the heart of Bennett’s proposal is “to cultivate the ability to 
discern nonhuman vitality, to become perceptually open to it”101—which on the face of 
it, chimes closely with Weber’s ambition. For Bennett, the active powers issuing from 
non-subjects express the liveliness intrinsic to materiality that Bennett calls “thing-
power,” which is “an alternative to the object as a way of encountering the nonhuman 
world.”102 Matter is materialization and “things” have a productivity of their own. Being 
animate is, on this view, a matter of degree, and inorganic matter displays powers of self-
organization and is “much more variable and creative than we ever imagined.”103  
  For Bennett, however, matter’s powers of self-organization do not rely on 
humans preserving “nature” or playing any other facilitative role. She uses the example 
of metal to communicate the liveliness of the inorganic,104 drawing, in part, on Deleuze 
and Guattari who refer to “metal as the exemplar of vital materiality,” a material 
exhibiting “the prodigious idea of Nonorganic Life.”105 Bennett suggests that 
metallurgists, artisans, mechanics, woodworkers, builders, cooks, cleaners, “(and anyone 
else intimate with things) encounter a creative materiality with incipient tendencies and 																																																								
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propensities, which are variably enacted depending on the other forces, affects, or bodies 
with which they come into close contact.”106 Matter, as she puts it, drawing on a 
quotation from Massumi, is a “pressing crowd of incipiencies and tendencies.”107    
It is not necessarily easy for humans in the everydayness of ordinary embodied 
life to see these forms of liveliness, but Bennett argues that what we humans take to be 
objects only seem to be static because their “becoming proceeds at a speed or a level 
below the threshold of human discernment.”108 Bennett accepts that humans tend to 
distinguish things from persons, but points out that “the sort of world we live in makes it 
constantly possible for these two sets of kinds to exchange properties.”109 The liveliness 
here, however, is neither “transpersonal or intersubjective but impersonal, an affect 
intrinsic to forms that cannot be imagined (even ideally) as persons.”110 This embrace of 
the impersonal nature of material liveliness seems to be an important potential 
distinction between Bennett’s ontology and that of Weber. Bennett’s account of lively 
matter is also not strictly speaking zoocentric—even in an expanded sense that moves 
beyond a focus on the animal to something approaching a life force. Nor does Bennett 
posit an eco-romantic “I-Thou” relation with “nature” or with “natural forces.” Her 
thought arguably takes materialism into register that eschews biocentrism as well as 
anthropocentrism.111 Thus, while Bennett shares Weber’s passion for awakening a 
perceptual responsiveness to non-human material agency, her mode of communication 
and her ontological framing seem more insistently to emphasize the agentic liveliness of 
non-human matter in a way that foregrounds the idea that “[t]he locus of agency” is 
“always a human-nonhuman working group”112—and this would be the case, presumably, 
even when the frame of attention is placed on human beings operating a “human-
human” or a “human-nature” relationship. Inorganic and artefactual material actants are 
thus necessarily fully significant for “why collectives involving humans take the form 
they do.”113 
The kind of “distributed agency” that Bennett traces reflects the capacity to 
affect or to be affected that is typical of all matter. And this affect forms a central focus 
of New Materialist analyses, more broadly.114 New Materialism foregrounds impersonal 
material processes of production that emerge as “assemblages” “in a kind of chaotic 
network of habitual and non-habitual connections, always in flux, always reassembling in 
different ways.”115 The centrality of the assemblage to New Materialist analysis links 
ontology to politics in a way that is particularly salient for the complexities of 
Anthropocene-Capitalocene planetary predicament. Since “there is nothing to prevent a 																																																								
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relation conventionally thought of as ‘micro’ (e.g. a local transaction) and a ‘macro’ 
relation (e.g. a nation-state or a climate pattern) [being] drawn into an assemblage by an 
affective flow,” New Materialist analysis is wide-ranging in focus. The affects of macro-
structural projects (such as the international economy) can be drawn together with 
critical attention to “micro-powers of governmentality,” and with a whole constellation 
of actants; biological urges; movements of herds or flocks; transits of toxins, viruses, 
nutrients, water, air; the physical infrastructure of a power supply, the movement of 
electrons, patterns of discourse, and so much more besides.  
 One particularly useful contribution to New Materialist thought for the 
Anthropocene-Capitalocene is offered by Alaimo in Bodily Natures: Science, Environment and 
the Material Self.116 Alaimo’s work foregrounds embodiment, materiality and 
interconnection (as Weber’s does), but takes corporeal entanglements into an urgent 
political encounter with toxicity. Alaimo does not offer an eco-romantic theorization, 
though she does invoke the convergence of “concern and wonder” (terms Weber would 
embrace) that emerges when “the context for ethics becomes not merely social but 
material—the emergent, ultimately unmappable landscapes of interacting biological, 
climatic, economic and political forces.”117 These unmappable landscapes are 
encountered in Alaimo’s work through “trans-corporeality”, a mode of encounter and 
analysis which, she argues, enables a “thinking across bodies” and a “movement across 
bodies” that “opens up a mobile space that acknowledges the often unpredictable and 
unwanted actions of human bodies, nonhuman creatures, ecological systems, chemical 
agents, and other actors”.118 Alaimo’s emphasis on the “trans-” also demands “more 
capacious epistemologies” and, she suggests, “allows us to forge ethical and political 
positions that can contend with . . . late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century 
realities....”119  
  Importantly, trans-corporeality brings corporeal theories, science studies and 
environmental theories into a complexly productive engagement responding to the need 
for “modes of analysis that travel through the entangled territories of material and 
discursive, natural and cultural, biological and textual.”120 Analysis itself, in other words, 
is a trans-corporeal assemblage—and Alaimo is careful to acknowledge that the deep 
realities of trans-corporeality are already being registered in a wide range of intellectual, 
cultural, material spaces, in scholarship, activisms, art practices and broader socio-cultural 
practices. 
 Alaimo rightly foregrounds the well-founded feminist suspicion of biology and of 
“nature” as constructs that have long been used to privilege Eurocentric, masculinist 
rationalism and concomitantly to denigrate women, indigenous peoples and all other 
humans (and non-humans) constructed as being less than fully rational. This critique of 
biology and “nature” is critical, I suggest, for thinking about onto-political alternatives—
not least because the distributions of privilege and marginalization marking them are 
fundamental to the Anthropocene-Capitalocene. There is, in short, a significant 
continuity between science, biology, “nature” and a highly unjust, gendered, raced, 
politics of juridical “neutrality” that needs overtly calling out. Alaimo signals an acutely 
injustice-sensitive aspect of feminist New Materialist work when she argues that 
“Perhaps the only way to truly oust the twin ghosts of biology and nature is, 
paradoxically, to endow them with flesh, to allow them to materialize more fully, and to 																																																								
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attend to their precise materializations.”121  
 Many of these materializations in the Anthropocene-Capitalocene necessitate an 
explicit focus on risk and toxicity. Alaimo places a strong epistemological and political 
emphasis on the trans-corporeal transit of toxins, a transit that is intimately local and 
simultaneously entangled with regulatory negligence, environmental degradation and 
global patterns of social injustice.122 Such trans-corporeal vectors necessitate an 
epistemological expansion, not just for tracing the ways in which “trans-corporeality 
often ruptures ordinary knowledge practices,” but also for embracing “particular 
moments of confusion and contestation that occur when individuals and collectives must 
contend not only with the materiality of their very selves but with the often invisibly 
hazardous landscapes of risk society.” 123  
  This necessity for an epistemological shift reflects an immersive entanglement 
within “incalculable, interconnected material agencies that erode even our most 
sophisticated modes of understanding.”124 Citing Beck, Alaimo argues that, 
“Understanding the risks requires the ‘sensory organs’ of science—theories, experiments, 
measuring instruments—in order to become visible or interpretable as hazards at all.”125 
Given that, as members of the risk society, we cannot “know” without such sensory 
organs, scientific knowledge becomes a pre-requisite for “survey[ing] the landscape of 
the self.”126 One implication, therefore, of Alaimo’s work is that an account of the self 
for the Anthropocene-Capitalocene must go beyond an existential account of human 
ontological entanglement with “nature” and must explicitly highlight the entanglements 
of the self in the structural assemblages of a trans-corporeal materiality emphatically 
marked by toxic risk. The risks at stake here also require understanding materiality itself 
as agential within a frame that brings into view the immense complexity of flows and 
forces at work: economic, political, juridical, cultural, climatic, spatial, chemical, viral, 
molecular, racial, sexual, extractive, appropriative, emissive, calculative, regulatory and so 
on. And, as result, as Alaimo rightly points out, trans-corporeality “demands more 
responsible, less confident epistemologies.”127 It also means that “The self becomes 
unrecognizable in the material memoir… because self-knowledge in risk society demands 
‘scientific’ understandings of a vast, coextensive materiality.”128  
  Alaimo’s account positions a powerful, critically-informed onto-politics firmly 
within the complex materialities of the Anthropocene-Capitalocene, in a feminist New 
Materialist reflection richly fed by strands of critical theory, literatures, themes and 
activisms that are not foregrounded by Weber’s poetic materialism. Alaimo’s important 
argument concerning the extension of science as a necessary sensory organ for the trans-
corporeal risk society contextualizes, by implication, existential poetics, with a critical 
injustice-sensitive framing. Such a framing, I suggest, is a non-negotiable component of 
living against the global networks of historical and contemporary injustice typifying 
neoliberalism’s appropriative colonization of lifeworlds. 
  It is clear that New Materialism radically de-centres the human. It focuses, in De 
Landa’s words, on the “idea that matter has morphogenetic capacities of its own and 
does not need to be commanded into a generating form.”129 How then, might we 																																																								
121 Ibid, 6. 
122 Ibid, 15. 
123 Ibid, 17. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid, 19. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid, 22. 
128 Ibid, 24.	
129 Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies (Ann Arbor: Open 
Humanities Press, 2012), 43. 
construct New Materialist entanglements and “relationalities” for the Anthropocene-
Capitalocene with commoning in mind?  
  One insight that we might follow, one Weber would undoubtedly share and 
endorse, is the idea that “all bodies are kin in the sense of inextricably enmeshed in a 
dense network of relations.”130 Haraway, arguably, has offered most to this particular 
thread, both in her alternative figuration for the Anthropocene-Capitalocene—the 
“Chthulucene”—and, in her emphasis on “staying with the trouble” and her call to active 
“kin-making.”131 Several commons-sustaining insights emerge, in particular, from 
Haraway’s chapter on “Tentacular Thinking” in Staying with the Trouble.132  
  Haraway is deeply attentive to the multiplicity of connections at stake in 
contemporary planetary dilemmas. Without denying the ultimate sense in which 
everything is ultimately entangled, she insists that “nothing is connected to everything; 
everything is connected to something,” meaning that while everything may ultimately be 
connected to everything else, the “specificity and proximity of connections matters—who 
we are bound up with and in what ways.”133 This question of who we are bound up with in 
what ways, it seems to me, lies at the heart of commoning, and is rich with implication 
for the kind of embodied, situated awareness at the heart of Weber’s commons ontology. 
In a commons, we could say, it matters how humans and other lively non-human 
commoners of all kinds—organic and inorganic—are understood to be bound up with 
each other, and in what ways. It matters whether human-non-human distributed 
agency/affect is made visible or invisible by the onto-epistemic framing in play. It 
matters how the incipiencies and propensities of the organic and inorganic actants 
meshed in a commons assemblage might co-generate or co-shape normative relations in 
that particular assemblage.134  
  In the light of New Materialist onto-epistemology, human commoners are best 
seen as members of a “specifically endowed (but not special) environment-making 
species”135 entangled with other specifically endowed, but not necessarily special, non-
human kinds of commoners. In this connection, it is useful to embrace “sympoiesis” 
rather than “autopoiesis.” Weber—writing in his analytical biological scientist mode 
rather than in his poetic, existentialist mode—embraces autopoiesis for its emphasis on 
the capacity of organisms to self-produce: “organisms [,while] … no longer viewed as 
genetic machines, [are] basically . . . materially embodied processes that bring forth 
themselves.”136 Haraway, however, in line with the assemblage thinking of New 
Materialism, prefers sympoiesis, precisely because rather than emphasizing the “self-
producing,” it emphasizes the  “collectively producing.” Haraway observes, moreover, 
that   
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. . . many systems are mistaken for autopoietic when they are really sympoietic. I think 
this point is important for thinking about rehabilitation (making liveable again) and 
sustainability amid the porous tissues and open edges of damaged but still ongoing living 
worlds, like the planet earth and its denizens in current times being called the 
Anthropocene.137  
 
Sympoiesis also complicates the boundaries of assemblages/commons by 
emphasizing trans-corporeal flows of information, affect and distributed agency: 
Sympoiesis refers to  
 
collectively-producing systems that do not have self-defined spatial or temporal 
boundaries. Information and control are distributed among components. The systems 
are evolutionary and have the potential for surprising change.138 
 
  As Haraway argues, “[i]f it is true that neither biology nor philosophy supports 
the notion of independent organisms in environments, that is, interacting units plus 
contexts/rules, then sympoiesis is the name of the game in spades.”139 Sympoiesis, in 
rejecting interacting units plus contexts/rules, and in emphasizing the membranous, 
porous nature of system-entanglements, offers rich insights and questions for commons 
imaginaries. Are commons sympoietic? Should they be understood as such? What is 
gained and lost in such an understanding? What about seeing them as “multipoietic?” 
Would the removal of the “sym-” open up a different space for critical reflection on 
power relations and struggles “internal” to commons in a way responsive to critical 
histories of exclusion? Do commons have self-defined boundaries, or are they more 
accurately to be conceived of as contingently identified assemblages with frayed and 
porous membranes that underline the need for sustained attention to questions of 
extension, membership and power? How is the “skin” of any particular commons to be 
identified—and for which purposes? Who are the potential (human and non-human) 
commoners at stake in any given commons assemblage—and in relation to what? If 
thinking of interacting units plus contexts/rules is out, how are commons normativities 
to be co-woven? What might such questions mean for digital commons? To what extent 
can who “we” are bound up with and in what ways be de-localized in physical terms, but 
re-localized in material intimacies forged by trans-corporeal relationalities that overspill 
particular ground-based commons boundaries—such as is the case with cyber-
commons? We could go on.   
  I think one important gain from framing a commons as an assemblage and/or as 
a site of sympioetic/multipoetic commoning is its focus on co-negotiation, contingency, 
and the need to analyse critically what counts and for whom and why in a messy play of 
world-making. It also means admitting, and tracing the full ethical implications of the 
fact that, in Bryant’s words, the 
 
nonhuman . . . in the form of technologies, weather patterns, resources, diseases, 
animals, natural disasters, the presence or absence of roads, the availability of water, 
animals, microbes, the presence or absence of electricity and high speed internet 
connections, modes of transportation, and so on . . . and many more besides play a 
crucial role in bringing humans together in particular ways.140 																																																								
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 Thinking of this kind is significant for a political ecology of the commons. It calls 
for fresh attention to the “graspings, frayings, and weavings, passing relays again and 
again, in the generative recursions that make up living and dying.”141 It invites an 
accounting for the “shifting states and capacities, which in turn produce further shifting 
states and capacities in a non-linear, rhizomatic way that spreads out in all directions 
sometimes in patterned ways, sometimes unpredictably.”142 It invites “tentacular 
thinking,” which is the kind of thinking that moves along with spider-like feelers, rather 
than buying into outdated and destructive illusions of ocularcentric human mastery (such 
as those driving neoliberal environmental governmentality).  
  As Haraway insists, it matters “what ideas we use to think other ideas.”143 
Tentacular thinking inspires,  
 
ecology of practices, [a commitment] to the mundane articulating of assemblages 
through situated work and play in the muddle of messy living and dying. Actual players, 
articulating with varied allies of all ontological sorts (molecules, colleagues and much 
more) must compose and sustain what is and will be. Alignment in tentacular worlding 
must be a seriously tangled affair!144 
 
  Commons are ideally placed to function as “on-the-ground collectives capable of 
inventing new practices of imagination, resistance, revolt, repair and mourning, and of 
living and dying well.”145 Commons are assemblages richly gifted with intimate 
possibilities for “staying with the trouble,” staying willingly immersed in the messy 
incompletion of resistive, trans-corporeally aware, scientifically-sensing, living against the 
managerial coloniality of the Anthropocene-Capitalocene. Haraway’s important invitation 
to “stay with the trouble” in this way is precisely what necessitates “making kin” of all 
kinds. There is an urgent need to learn “practices of becoming with” more-than-human 
collaborators. As Haraway puts it,    
 
We are at stake to each other. Unlike the dominant dramas of Anthropocene and 
Capitalocene discourse, human beings are not the only important actors in the 
Chthulucene, with all other beings able simply to react. The order is reknitted: human 
beings are with and of the earth, and the biotic and abiotic powers of this earth are the 
main story.146 
  
  Haraway is right to argue that, “diverse human and nonhuman players are 
necessary in every fiber of the tissues of the urgently needed Chthulucene story.”147 
There are no guarantees of immunity from neoliberal subversion of commons, but 
actively turning towards more-than-human commoners—allowing them actively to co-
shape the normative praxis of a commons—holds out a space, at least, where a resistive, 
alert, subversive onto-politics of radical inclusion and care might work against neoliberal 
reductionisms and objectifications. Certainly, “in an age where we are faced with the 
looming threat of monumental climate change, it is [now] irresponsible to draw our 																																																								
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distinctions in such a way as to exclude nonhuman actors.”148 It seems vital to move 
beyond thinking and speaking of commons as “human-human” and “human-nature” 
relations and explicitly to embrace commoning as a “human-non-human” co-practice for 
which non-human commoners are active, generative contributors.  
  While eco-romanticism presents a powerful emotional appeal to the reader’s 
sense of embodied entanglement, in the final analysis (and despite its potential to reach 
some who might not be moved by alternative vocabularies), it provides an incomplete 
answer to the global scale and complexity of the problems and dilemmas to which new 
commons movements are an insurgent response. And, as powerful and valuable as 
poetics is as a tool of existential awakening, it is not poetic materialism that ultimately 
offers the most critically informed, injustice-sensitive grounding for commons ontology 
in an age of systematic oppression. The trans-corporeal nature of climate risk and the 
toxic flows marking all planetary existence suggests the vital importance of a highly 
politicized and critical commons onto-epistemology, one alive to the potentially 
oppressive implications of “nature” as a construct, alert to its pattern of historical 
injustices and their links with contemporary mal-distributions of risk, hazard, life and 
death. New Materialism, perhaps especially as deployed by feminist New Materialist 
thinkers, arguably offers vocabulary, wide-ranging critical literacy, and accounts of an 
emergent onto-epistemology especially suited to re-grounding commoning as a form of 
human-non-human onto-insurgency against the multiple, pathological closures of the 
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